A b s t r a c t , Via a 2-stage linear-quadratic 2-person nonzero-sum game, we show that such decision problems might admit nonlinear Nash solutions. As compared with the linear strategy, a nonlinear Nash policy might lead to a better performance for at least one of the players.
nonlinear equilibrium solutions for a simple 2-stage linear-quadratic nonzero-sum (LQNZS) game. The example given in the paper is the simplest L Q N Z S game which admits nonlinear Nash solutions.
L Q N Z S G a m e a n d D e r i v a t i o n of N o n l i n e a r N a s h Solutions
Consider the 2-stage L Q N Z S game defined by the difference equations x(1) = x(0) + u(0) + v(0), x(0) = Xo, (I-1)
x(2) = x(1) + u(1), (1) (2) where all variables are scalar and take their values in ~1. u(0) and u (1) are control variables of Player 1 at stages zero and one, respectively, and v(0) is the control variable of Player 2 at stage zero. Player 1 has access to x 0 at stage zero and both x 0 and x(1) at stage one. Player 2 acts only at stage zero and has access to x o . We denote b y / ' 0 the class of all measurable maps from ~ onto NI, by ./'1 those that map ~1 × ~ onto ~1. At stage zero, Players 1 and 2 pick, respectively, V0(')~ P0, 72(') ~ P0; and, at stage one, Player 1 picks Yl(.,-) e / ' 1 . Then, the costs incurred to Players 1 and 2 are given by J1 and J2, respectively, where
With these definitions, {7o*~/~o, 71 * e £'~, 72 *E Fo} constitutes a Nash strategy triple to the game posed above, if it satisfies
L(7o*, rl*, 72*) ~< L(7o*, 71", 75), for all 7o ~ Po, 71 ~/ 1 , V2 E F o . Now, for any Nash equilibrium triple {u(1) = yl(x(1), Xo), u(0) = 7o(Xo), v(0) == 72(Xo)}, the dependence of 71(-,-) on x(1) and x o will be through
where
and ~b(., .) is any scalar function of two variables with the property that ~b(y, y) = 0 V y ~ ~1. We note that, for fixed )'o('), 72('), the strategy defined by (4-1) is unique in value (which is --½Xl) but nonunique in representation as a control policy of Player 1 at stage one. If we now take ~b(., .) to be ~b(y, z ) = ( y 2 z2)p, where p is any scalar parameter, the optimal Nash strategies ~,0*(x0), 72"(xo) that correspond to this functional form will be given by (after some rather extensive manipulations, details of which are given in the Appendix)
is not satisfied, and it turns out that, for this special case, it is not possible to find a nonlinear Nash solution. The reason for this singularity in the Nash solution is that, when/3 = 1, the original game can be converted into an equivalent team problem (standard LQ optimal regulator problem) which is well-known to admit a unique linear solution. We note that, with /3 .,4 1 and { x 0 t ~< M for any arbitrary but fixed positive constant M, it is always possible to find a scalar p such that conditions (5-3) and (5-4) are satisfied. Hence, we have the following theorem.
T h e o r e m 2. where 7'o*('), 9/2*(") are given by (5-1) and (5-2), respectively, and p is scalar satisfying
P r o o f . This is a direct consequence of the discussion given prior to the statement of Theorem 2.1. The Nash property of the triple (6) can also be verified directly by showing that it satisfies Inequalities (3). The conditions on p merely ensure that Ineq. (5-4) is satisfied.
C o m p a r i s o n of Different N a s h Costs a n d Discussion
Let us now assume that /3 = 0 and determine the optimal Nash costs, corresponding to these nonlinear Nash strategies, as functions of the parameter p. Substituting (6) into (2) Comparing (8) with (7) we observe that Player 1 does much better with a nonlinear solution (for large values of p) than he does with the linear solution given by (8-1), since JI*(P) --~ 0 in the limit asp --+ or. Referring back to (2-1), we note that the minimum possible value of ]1 is zero and, hence, Player 1 does the best that he can possibly do, with the nonlinear strategy (6-1) and (6-2) for large values ofp. However, it can be shown that the nonlinear solution does not bring any advantage to Player 2 and he does worse with (6-3) than he would do with (8-1). Consequently, Player 2 would insist on sticking to a linear strategy, hence creating an ambiguous situation which necessitates communication of some kind between the two players, in order to arrive at an acceptable compromise. It should be clear from the above that the method used to obtain the nonlinear Nash strategies is not limited only to the 2-stage problem considered in the paper, but can be used to obtain nonlinear solutions for multistage LQNZS games with the classical CL information structure for at least one of the players. This implies that equilibrium solutions of deterministic multiperson-multiobjective decision problems will not be unique in general, which is a serious threat to the validity of the existing resutts in the literature on game theory. Intersection points of these reaction curves determine the Nash strategies for the static game (9), as functions of Yo and Y2 • Now, if we want to obtain the Nash strategies to the original dynamic game, it will be sufficient to replace u(0) by 7o and v(0) by 73 in (10) and solve for common solutions to the resulting equations, In fact, making the substitutions in (I0) will resuk in the simpler expressions ~1 +27o = 0, where xl is defined by (4-2). A common solution to (11) is given by (5-1) and (5-2), and the conditions of intersection of the reaction curves are (5-3) and (5-4). It is not difficult now to see that (5-1), (5-2), and (6-1) satisfy Inequalities (3) and, hence, constitute a Nash equilibrium solution to the problem. 8o9/~4/4-4
